Introduction
A rec ent articl e in the American Journal of Public Health no ted the high correlatio n between the lead con tent of soil in urban areas and the elevated bl ood-lead levels of children in these cities .' An editorial in the same issue of the Jou rnal suggested that the "use of leaded gasoline and [high ] traffic density" he lped explain th is observation. 2 For most public health expe rts, the controversy over the possible adverse effec ts of leaded gasoline began in the 1970s. What we intend to show in this pa per is th at as earl y as the 1920s public health experts , government officials, scie ntists, corporate leaders, labor, and the public were acutely aware of the dangers posed by the introductio n of lead into gasoline. T he depth of concern was manifes ted by the fact that leaded gasoline was banned in New York Cit y for over three years and in many states and other municipalities for shorter periods of time. In 1925, the production of leaded gaso line was halted for over nine months, During the 1920s, the petrochemical and auto mobile industries emerged as the corporate backbo ne of the United States. Because the acceptance or rejection of leaded gaso~ line had profound implications for these industries. a spirited and ofte n heated controve rsy arose. Public health professionals found themselves under intense press ure to sa nction and minimize the hazards associated with the manufact ure and use of thi s new potentially (oxic substance and the pages of the American Journal of Public Health we re compromi sed during the months and years when the fate of leaded gasoline was being decided. The debates of th at era centered on issues of health and public po licy th at remai n current toda y. Numerous questions arose regarding the evaluation of health hazards assoc iated with new and potentially h arm~ fu l substances, including: How can scientists evaluate the relative importance of acute and chronic effects of toxic subs tances? What should constitute adequate proof of safe ty or harm? What busin ess, professio nal, or government age n~ des should be responsible for eval uating possibl y dangerous sub stances? How does o ne study potentially toxic s ub~ stances while protecting the right to health of human subjects? Does industry have to prove a new sub stance safe o r do public health experts have to prove it dangerous ? In th e face of scientific uncertainty concerning the safe ty or dangers posed by leaded gasoline , a nd the perceived need for this substance by the au to mobile industry , the broader que stion became: What was the level of acceptable risk that society should be willing to ass ume for industrial progress'? By examining thi s controversy. we will illustrate ho w, a t every stage of the debate, the political, economic, and scientific iss ues we re inextricably intertwined .
Leaded Gasolin e Developed
Before the 1920s. the automobile industry was expand· ing and highl y competitive. In addition to national manufac~ turers suc h as Ford , Ge neral Motors, and Studebaker, there were local companies , sometimes arising out of former bicycle manufac turers, th at co mpeted for special markets. Ford dominated the pre~19 2 0 market , however, producing nearly half of all the ca rs bought by Ame ricans. It s Mode l T , small and cheaply produced, was the standard for the industry. In the 1920s. General Motors developed a numbe r of marketing and styli sti c inn ovations that al10wed it to replace Ford as the number o ne producer by the end of that decade. Alfred Sloan, presid ent of General Motors, explained that their strategy called for creating demand "no t fo r basic transportatio n, but for progress in new cars for comfort , conve ni ence, power a nd style. " Ce ntral to the creation of powerful and large aut omobiles was the development of a more effic ie nt fue l capable of driving cars at greater speed . In 1922, Thomas Midgley and co-workers at the General Motors Research Laboratory in Dayton , Ohio di scove red that adding tetraethy l lead to gasoline raised the co mpression and hence, speed , by eliminating th e engine " knock". This all owed fo r the development of the " modern " automobile produced over the nex t 50 years.)
General Moto rs, which had an interloc king directorship with the DuPont Che mical Co mpany , quickly contracted with DuPont and Stand ard Oil of New Jersey to produce tetraet hyl lead. Leaded gasoli ne was placed on sale in selected markets on February I, 1923 . In 1924, DuPont and General Motors created the Ethyl Corpo ratio n to market and produce its final product. This was done in spite of the fact th at industrial hygienists such as Alice Hamilton had long since identified lead as an industrial toxin ..... '
Scientisls Question Safety
In the very year that Midgl ey and his co-workers at General Motors Research Corporat ion herald ed the discovery of this powerful an t i~k n ock compou nd , scientists in and outside of government warned that telr'dethyllead might be a potent threat to th e public's health . Wil.li am Mansfi eld Clark, a professor of chemistry , wrote to A. M. Stimson , Assistant Surgeon General at the Public Health Service, in October of 1922 warning of "a serio us menace to the public health. " He noted that in the earl y productio n of tetraet hyl lead . "several very serious cases of lead po isoning have resulted." He feared that its use in gasoline would result in enviro nmenta l poll ution, theorizing that "on busy thoroughfares it is highly probable that the lead oxide dust will remain in the lower stratum. "8.9 Stimson believed that " the possibilities of a real health menace do exist in the use of such a fu el and it is deemed advisab le that the Service be provided with some experimen· tal evidence lending to support this opinion. " He suggested that it was in the province of the Division of Chemi stry and Pharmacology to conduct investigations of the dangers,lO·11
The director of that divisio n o pposed thi s suggestion because such an investigation would take " a considerable period of time, perhaps a year," and that the result s wou ld be of little " practical use since the trial of the material under o rdinary conditions [of useJ should sho w whether there is a risk to man." He recommended in stead that the Public Health Service depend upon industry itself to provide them with relevant data. 12 One month later, H . S. Cu mming, the Surgeon General, wrote to P. S . DuPont , Chairm an of the Board of the DuPont Company, asking whether th e public health effects of tetraethyl lead manufacturing and use had been taken into account. He was an swered by Thomas Midgley himself who allowed that although the question " had bee n given very se rious consideratio n . .. no actual experimental data has been take n." Despite the lack of experimental data, OM and DuPont were confident that " the average stree t will probably be so free from lead that it will be impossi ble to detect it or its absorpt ion . "13. 1" DuPont and General Motors recognized that, in view of the apprehension about the potenti al health hazards of tetraethyl lead, a purel y private in-hou se stud y of its safety would be met by skepticis m and rejecti o n. Therefore. rather than conduct its ow n investigations, it worked a ut an agreement with the US Bureau of Mines. The agreement called for the General Motors Resea rch Corporation to provide funding fo r an investigation of the dangers of tetraet hyllead and for the Bureau of Mines to provide the faci lities and the imprimatur of the US Gove rnment on the results of suc h an investigation. GM . through its prime nego tiator, Charles Kettering, requested one other proviso: that " the Bureau refrain from givi ng out the usual press and progress reports during the course of the work, as [OM] feels that the newspape rs are apt to give scare head lines and false impressions before we definitel y know what the influe nce of the material will be,"1 3
Corporate Veto and Censorship
It was clear t.o man y that this was a po liticall y explosive inquiry. For example, th e chief chemist , S. C, Lind, wrote to the superintendent of the Pittsburgh Bureau of Mines Field Station where the inve stigation was being carried out objecting to the gove rnment 's use .of the trade name "ethyl" when referring to tetraethyl lead gasoline, saying, "Of course their [G M's] abject in doing so are fairly clear, and among other things they are nat particularly de sirous .of having the name ' lead ' appear in thi s case, That is alright from the standpoint of the General Matars Campany but it is quite a questian in my mind as to whether the Bureau of Mines wauld be justified in adopting thi s name so earl y in the game before it has had the support of popular usage." The superintendent replied that the avaidance of "the use .of ' lead' in the in terbureau correspondence" was intentio nal because of leaks to the newspapers. Si nce the Bureau had agreed to a blackout of information, he asserted that " if it shoul d happen to get some publicity accide ntally , it would not be sa bad if the word ' lead' were .omitted as this term is apt to prejudice somewhat against its use, " 16.17 T he willi ngness of the Bureau of Mines to avoid publicity and even accurate scie ntific terminology in favor of a trade name reHected the Bureau's weak position vis-a-vis the gian t corporations, GM and DuPont. T hi s was furth er eviden t in the ubsequent agreeme nt s developed betwee n the gove rnm ent , OM , DuPo nt, and the newly created Eth yl Gasoli ne Corparation. The first agreeme nt in September 1923 between the General Mators Research Corporatia n and the Bureau allowed relative freedom farthe Bureau ta report its final conclusions , IS However, by June 1924, General Motors sa ught much greater control over the final product. Not only had the corporation demanded that no publicity cancerning the research be give n to the popular press, it now added ta the contract the stip ul atio n that "all manu sc ri pts, before publication , will be submi tted to the Co mpany fo r camment and crit icis m."ISI Two months after the Bureau acqui esced ta th is new stipulation, tbe newl y created Et hyl Corporatio n asked tha i their proposed contract be modified so that " before publication of any papers or articles by your Bureau, they should be submitted to them [Ethyl] for co mment. criti cis m, and approval." These changes were incorporated into the new contract givi ng the Et hyl Corparatian veta power aver the research of the U niled States Government. 10 Despite the insistence of OM, DuPont , and the US Gavernment that na information should be released before completion of the study, it is clear from the unpublis hed correspondence thai thi s agreement was vialated when it appeared that the preliminary results painted taward a vindicatian of the companies' faith in tetraethyllead. In Ju ly 1924-twa years after leaded gaso line was fi rst put o n the market in the mid-wes t and the east coast and five months befare the preliminary report was released-the GM director of research . Oraham Edgar, wrote to Dr. Paul Leech of the American Medical Association that the result s of the Bureau .of Mines' research wauld s how "that th ere is no danger of acquiring lead paisoning through even prolanged ex pasure to exhaust gases .of cars using Ethyl Gas." He further assured the AMA that I'poisoning [rom carban manaxide wauld ari se long before the co ncentration of lead wauld reach a point where eve n cum ul ati ve poisaning is to be feared. " 2 1
Oil Company Disaster
The indu stry'S assurances of the safety of leaded gaso· line were undermined by a horrifying disaster that occ urred in the Standard Oil Company' s experimental labaratories in Elizabeth. New Je rsey. Between October 26 and October 30, 1924, five workers died and 35 others expe rienced severe palsies , tremars, ha lluc in at io ns, and a ther serio us neurolagical sy mptams of organic lead poisaning. T hu s, of 49 warkers in the tetraethyllead processing plant , aver 80 per cent died or were seve rel y poisa ned. On the first day, the New York Times quated the company doctor who suggested that " nothing aught to be said abaut this matter in the public interest ," and .o ne of the s upervisars at the Bayway facility who said " these men probably we nt insane because they worked lOa hard ." T he father of the dead man, however, "was bitter in denunciation of conditions at the plant" and told reporters that .. Ernest was told by the doctors at the plant that working in the laboratory wouldn 't hurt him. Otherwise he would have quit. They said he'd have to get used to it.' '22.23 After this initial revelation , every major newspaper in New York began to report on conditions at the plant. Day after day, the Times. the New York World , and other newspapers revealed deaths and occupationally related insanity due to what the newspapers called " Iooney gas" , 2.
The company continually sought to deny management 's responsibility for the tragedy. At a press co nfere nce, Thomas Midgley asserted that true responsibility for the crisis rested with the workers. He said that at another plant "the men, regardless of warnings and provision for their protec· tion, had failed to appreciate the dangers of constant absorp· tion of the fluid by their hands and arms,"n Despite Standard Oil's attempt to shift blame to workers, others were reaching different conclusions. The Union County (New Jersey) prosecutor asserted th at he was "satisfied many of the workers did not know the danger they were running. I also believe some of the workers were not masked nor told to wear rubber gloves and rubber boots. "26.27 The New lersey Commissioner of Labor said he had never been informed that the workers in the Bayway plant were potentiaJly in danger. " Secrecy surrounding the experiments was responsible for the Labor Department 's lack of knowledge of them," an official said. 28 These deaths and the continuing controversy stimulated renewed concern about the potential public health dangers from the exhaust produced by leaded gasoline. Despite Standard Oil's assurance that no "perils existed in the use of this gas in automobiles," New York City, New York State, Philadelphia, and man y other municipalities and states banned the sale of leaded gasoline. 29 
Bureau of Min es Report Issued
On the day after the fifth and last victim died , and in the midst of growi ng public skepticism about thi s new chemical, the Bureau of Mines released its preliminary findi ngs on the possible dangers of leaded gasoline to th e general pUblic. The New York Times headline summed up the report: The Times also reponed " the investigation carried out indicates the danger of sufficient lead accumulation in the streets through the discharging of scale from automobile motors to be seem ingly remote ." In short, the report exoner· ated tetraethyl lead .)O Despite the desire of the manufactur· ers to use the report to reassure the public, the circumstances of the workers' deaths only served to undermine the credibility of the Bureau of Mines' findings. Specific criticisms came from a number of different sources. Scientists and labor activists alike found fault with the report. E. E. Free, editor of the prestigious Scientific: American magazine, was skeptical ofR. R. Sayers' assura nces that the Bureau of Mines could find no evidence of lead poisoning in experi. mental animals .)1.l2 Cecil K. Drinker, editor of the Journal of Industrial Hygiene a nd professor of public health at Harvard, and Dr. David Edsall , Dean of the Harvard Medical School , were also critical. In early January 1925, Drinker wrote a pointed letter to Sayers in which he concluded, "As an investigation of a n important problem in public health 346 upon which a great deal of inexact data has already appeared , the report is inadequate," l3-).1 Alice Hamilton con· curred with Drinker' s position a nd noted the " de sirability of having an investigation made by a public body which will be beyond suspicion. " ) 11
Dr. Allee Ilamiiton , (left) one of the country's foremost authorities on lead, opposed tetraethyllead In gasoline, while R. R. Sayers (right), who headed the Bureau of Mines, Issued the preliminary report exone.ratlng tetraethyllead as a hazard 10 the public.
Perhaps the strongest criticism of the Bureau of Mines' report came from the Workers' Health Bureau and one of its chief scientific advisors , Yandell Henderson , Professor of Applied Physiology at Yale University. Even before the report was iss ued, the Workers' Health Bureau-an organizatio n of pro-labor activitists devoted to investigating and organizing around occupational safety and health issuescalled for a united stand to oppose lead in gasoline . They pointed out that the crisis at Bayway indicated tbat both workers and the general public were in danger of lead poisoning, if lead were allowed to remain in gasoline. )7. ) 8 Henderson, upon whom the Workers' Health Bureau de· pended for much of their information about the dangers of tetraethyl lead, voiced the public health profession ' s nagging fear regarding the fact that "this investigation is financed by the Ethyl Gas Corporation" and that in spite of many protests "the in vestigators in the Bureau of Mines have used experimental conditions which are fundamentally unsuited to afford information on the real issues. " ) 9 In addition, he said, " it seems to me extremely unfortunate that the experts of the United States Government should be carrying out this investigation on a grant from the General MOlors." He felt " very strongly that there is the most urgent need for an absolutely unbiased investigation ."40 C. W. Deppe, owner of a competing molor car company, was much more blunt in his criticism of the government's relationship to GM , saying: "May I be pardoned if I ask you frankly now, does the Bureau of Mines exist for the benefit of Ford and the G.M. Corporation and the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, and other oil companies parties to the distribution of the Ethyl Lead Dopes, or is the Bureau supposed to be for the public benefit and in protection of life and health?"'"
Propaganda Efforts
This attack by scientists, public heaJth experts, and activists on the quality and integrity of the report forced those who favored the introduction of lead into gasoline to begin a counter offensive. Emery Hayhurst, a noted industri· al hygienist with the Ohio Department of Health , emerges as one of the key figures in the attempt to "sell " tetraethyllead to the American public. Hayhurst was important in the foUowing months and years because of his established reputation as a respected and independent industrial hygien· ist. But what was not known about Dr. Hayhurst during the months of struggle around this issue was the dual role he played in the controversy; at the same time he was advisi ng organizations like the Workers · Health Bureau about indus· trial hygiene matters. he was also working as a consultant for the Ethyl Corporation."2 It is also evident from correspon· dence between Hayhurst and the Public Health Service that Hayhurst was suppl ying advocates of tetraethyl lead with information regarding the tactics to be used by their oppo· nents. Indeed, even before the Bureau of Mines had issued its report, Hayhurst had decided thattelraethyllead was not an environmental toxin . He had advised th e Bureau of Mines lo include a slalemenl that " lhe finished producl, Ethyl Gasoline, as marketed and used both pure or diluted in gasoline retains none of the poisonous characteristics of the ingredients concerned in its manufacture a nd blending. ""2.0 Even more damning evidence is found in another letter to Sayers-when the attacks on the report were mountingwherein Hayhurst secretly sent to the Public Health Service copies of the critici sms that the Workers' Health Bureau had developed , so that the federal government could be prepared to repl y. Although the Workers' Health Bureau had specifically refrained from sending these comments to the government, Hayhurst violated their trusL""-'" Hayhurst and Say· ers a1so worked together to build public and professional support for the Bureau of Mines' and the Elhyl Corporation's position th at tetraethyl lead was not a public health danger. Sayers urged4S that Hayhurst counter the criticisms of Drinker and Edsall with a review or editorial of his own in support of the report. Hayhursl replied" lhal he had prepared an editorial for the American Journal of Public Healt"· that proclaimed, "ObservationaJ evidence and re· ports to various health officials over the country ... so far as we have been able to find out. corroborated the statement of 'complele safety· so far as the public heallh has been concerned.'·"9 Printed as an unsigned editorial , it gave Journal readers the impression that public health professionals had delermined that leaded gasoline posed no lhreal to the public's health.
Nevertheless, lhis propaganda e!fort did not quell the doublS aboul the safely of leaded gasoline or the inlegrilY of the Bureau of Mines' report . It also became apparent that the com panies were engaging in a cover·up of other deat hs and illnesses among their workers in other plants. In light of the publicity ove r Bayway, it was soon reported th at other workers had died handling letraethyllead at bOlh the DuPont chemical plant at Whatever we print, we pick up from the workers." The Times went on to describe the control that DU. Pont exercised over the local hospital to which its poisoned workers were sent, indicating that it was almost impossible to get informa· tion from the hospital about the source of the workers' problems. Despite this. the Times was able to uncover the fact that there had been ove r 300 cases of lead poisoning among workers at the Deepwater plant during the past two years. Workers at the DuPont facility ) knowing so mething was amiss, had dubbed the plant '·lhe House of the BUllerflies" because so many of their colleagues had hallucinations of insects during their bouts of lead poisoning: "The Victim pauses, perhaps while at work or in a rational conversation, gazes intently at space and snatches at something not there." The Times reported th at "aboul 80% of all who worked 'the House of the Butterflies; or who went into it to make repairs were poisoned , some repeatedly. "jO
Surgeon General Convenes Conference
As a result of these co ntinuing revelations and public disquiet over the Bureau of Mines repo rt , the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service contemplated calling a national conference to assess the tetraethyllead situation. In a frank letter to the Surgeon General , Haven Emerson, the eminent public health leader, spelled out the concerns of public health officers. Eme rson stated that the Bureau of Mines' report was having "a widespread, and to my mind harmful , influence on public opinion and the actio ns of public agencies" and that it would be "well worthwhile to call those whom you intend to a conference promptly." He feared that there was a growing impression that the interests of those who may expecl profit from the public sale of tetraethyl lead compounds have been influential in postpon· ing such a meeting. j, Despite some indication that R. R. Sayers opposed such a conference and may have delayed it,j2 the Surgeon General an nounced at the end of April 1925 that he was calJing together experts from business , labor, and pubHc health to assess the tetraethyl lead situation . 5 ) The conference convened on May 20, 1925 in Was hington. DC, with every major party represented. At the confer· ence, the ideologies of the different participants were clearly and repeatedly laid out , thus providing an important forum by which we can evaluate the scientific, political , economic, and intellectual issues surrounding this controversy. In the words of one participant, the conference gathered together in one room " two diametrically opposed conceptions. The men engaged in industry, chemists, and engineers. take it as a matter of course that a little thing like industrial poisoning should not be allowed to stand in the way of a greal induslrial advance. On the ot her hand, the sanit ary experts take it as a matter of course that the first consideration is the health of the people. "54 'Industrial Progress' Invoked
The conference opened with statements from General Motors, DuPonl. Slandard Oil , and the Elhyl Corporalion outlining the history of the development of leaded gasoline and the reasons why they believed its continued production was essential. Three themes eme rge as central arguments by the companies. First, the manufacturers maintained that leaded gasoline was essential to the industrial progress of America. Second, they maintained that any innovation en· tails certai n risks . Third, they stated that the major reason 
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This ad, appearing In a 1927 issue of Lift! magazine, never mentions lead. Photo credit: The Ohio Historical Society that deaths and il lnesses occurred at their plants was that the men who worked with the materials were careless and did not foHow instructions.
C. F . Keltering, of GM and Eth yl, and Robe rt Kehoe, scientific consultant to the industry, both stressed the importance of tetraeth yllead as a means of conserving motor fuel. But Frank Howard, representing the Ethyl Gasoline Corporation , provided the most complete ration ale for the continued use of tetraethy l lead in gasoline . He noted that it was not possible to abs tract the quest ions of public healt h from broader economic and political iss ues. "You have but one problem," he remarked rhetorically. " Is thi s a public health hazard?" He answered that " unfortunatel y, our problem is not that simple." Rather he posited that automobiles and oil were central to the industri al progress of the nation, if not the world. "Our continued development of motor fuels is esse ntial in our civ ilization." he proclaimed. Noting that at least a decade of re search had gone into th e effort to identify tetraethyl lead, he called its discovery an "apparent gift of God." By casting the issue in thi s way, Howard put the opposition on the defensive, making them appear to be reactionaries whose limited vision of the country's future could permanently retard progress and harm future generations . " What is our duty under the circumstances?", he asked. " Should we say , ' No, we will not use' .. a material 348 that is "a certain means of savi ng petroleum? Because some animals di e and some do not die in so me experiments, shall we give thi s thing up e ntirely?"S!I.s6
The stark portrayal of tetraethyl lead as a key to the industrial future of the nation led naturally into industry's second argument that a ny great advance required some sacrifice. Dr. H. C. Parmelee, editor of Chemical and Mewllurgicai Engineering. stated , "The research and development th at produced tetraethyl lead were conceived in a fine spirit of industrial progress looking toward the co nservation of gasoline and increased efficiency of internal combustion motors." Parme le e believed that the compan ies did their best to safeguard the workers. In th e end , he said. " its casualties we re negligible com pared to hU ma n sacrifice in the development of many ot her industrial en te rprises. "H-59 Companies Say Workers at Fawt
The final part of the industries' position was that workers. rathe r than the com panies, were at fault for the tragedies at Bayway, Deepwater, and Dayton . Acknowledging that there were "certain dangers" inherent in the production of this essential industrial product , the Stand ard Oil Company asserted that "every precaution was taken" by the company to protect th eir workers. Thomas Midgley, Jr. , vice president of Ge neral Motors and known as " the Father of Ethyl Gas ," was more pointed at the conference. He said that the lesson that the companies had learned out of this whole experience was that "the essential thing necessary to safely handle [tetraethyl lead] was careful discipline of our men ... [tetraethyl lead] becomes dangerous due to careless ness of the men in handling it." In a n ea rli er statement to the New York World. Midgley explai ned what this discipline consisted of: "The minute a man shows signs of exhilaration he is laid off. If he spills the stuff on himself he is fired. Because he doesn' t want to lose his job, he doesn't spiH it." Midgley's own recklessness was revealed at a news conference in whic h he sought to downplay the toxicity oftetraethyllead. Whe n asked by a reporter if it was dangerous to spill the chemical on one's hands. Midgley dramat ically "had an attendant bring in a quantity of pu re tetraethyl " with which he " was hed hi s hands thoroughl y in the fluid a nd dried the m on hi s ha nkerchief. 'I'm not taking any chance whateve r; he said . 'Nor would r take any c hance doing that every day.' .. Those who opposed the introduction of leaded gasoline disagreed with every fundamental position of industry representatives. First. oppo nent s pointed out that what we would now denote as inorganic lead compounds were already known to be a slow, cu mul ative poison that should not be introduced into the general environment. Second , they believed because of industry'S reckless disregard for workers' and th e public's health the federal governme nt had to ass ume re sponsi bility for protecting the health of the nation. Third , they rejected the notion that the workers were the ones responsible for thei r own poisoning. Fourth . and most importantl y, because they believed that the public's health should take precedence over the needs of indu stry, they argued that the burden of proof should be on the com panies to prove tetraeth yllead was safe rather than on oppone nts to prove that tetraethyl lead was dangerous .
Dr. Yandell Henderson, Yale physiologist , was the strongest and most authoritative critic of indust ry. He told the co nference that lead was a serious public health menace that coul d be equated to the serio us infectious diseases then affect ing the nation's hea lt h. Unl ike industry spokespeople who defined the problem as one of occupatio nal heal th and maintained th at individu al vigilance on the part of workers could solve the proble m, Hend erson believed that leaded gasoline was a public health and environ me ntal healt h issue th at required federal action. He ex pressed horror at the thought that hundreds of thousand s of pou nd s of lead would be deposited in the streets of every major ci ty in America. His warning to the conference of the long-term dangers proved to be a n acc urate prediction: " condi tions would grow worse so graduall y and the deve lopment of lead poisoning will co me on so insidiously . . . that leaded gasoline will be in nea rly universal use and large numbers of cars will have bee n sold . . , before the public and the government awaken to the situation . " 62,-64 To meet such a public healt h menace, Henderson and oth er critics believed that it was essential for the federal government to take an active role in controlling leaded gasoline. Harriet Silve rm an of the Workers' Health Bureau attacked the idea put forth by industry that th e wo rkers were responsible for the ir own poisoning, saying " I as k you gentle men to conside r the fact that you are asked to allow a man to be subjected to contact with a poison whi ch is considered haza rdous by the leadi ng scie ntists of the country. And whe n you ex pose them to the poison ou t of which the manufacturers are making profits. the manufactu rers penali ze those men by maki ng them forfeit a day's wage. "flS- 61 Opponent we re most concerned , however, about the industry propaga nd a that equ ated the use of lead wi th indu strial progress, and th e survival of our civili za tio n itself. Reac ting to the Eth yl Corporation representative's statement th at tetraeth yl lead was a " gift of God", Grace Burnham of the Workers' Health Bureau said it " was not a gift of God when those 1 1 men were killed or those 149 were poisoned ." She angril y qu estioned the priori ties of " this age of speed a nd ru sh and efficiency and mechanics" a nd said that " the thing we are interested in the long run is not mec hanics or machine ry, but men ." A. L. Berres, secretary of the Metal Trades De partment of the Ame rican Federation of Labor (AFL). also rej ected the prevalent conception of the 1920s that " th e business of America was business." He told the conference th at the AFL opposed the use of tetraeth yl lead, saying, " We feel that wh ere the health a nd ge neral welfare of hum anit y is concern ed , we ought to step slowl y." But it was Yand ell Henderson who sum marized the opponent s' positi on and deline ated the course for future policy ma kers . In a pri vate letter to R. R. Sayers of the Bureau of Min es, he said , " In the past , Ihe position ta ke n by the authorities has been th at nothing could be pro hibited until it was proved to have kill ed a number of people. I tru st th at in the future. es peciall y in a matter of th is sort , the posit io n will be that a sub sta nce like tetraethyl lead can not be introduced for ge neral use until it is proved harmless. "68 ,M
For the vast majority of public health experts at th e conference , the proble m was how to reconcile the opposing views of advocates of industrial progress and those frightened by the pote ntial for di saster. Although everyone hoped that science itself would provide an answer to th is imponde rable dilemma, the reaJ ity was that 311 evidence to this point was ambigu ous. One majo r problem was th at. in the 1920s. no one had a model for ex plaining the apparently idiosyn-cratic occurrence of lead poisoning. Even the medical director of Reco nstructio n Hospital in New York , probably Ihe only fac il ity at that time devoted exclusive ly 10 the study and treatment of occupational disease and accide nts, could not explai n the strange manifestations of chronic tetraethyllead poisoning. Of the 39 patients he treated arler the Bayway disaster, he said , " some of these individuals gave no physical evidence and no sy mptom or any evide nce that could be found by a ph ysical examin ation that would indicate that th ey were ill , but at th e same time showed lead in Ihe stools." He co nclud ed th at " perhaps a man may be poisoned from the tetraethyl lead without showing clinical evidence a nd that therefore , the re may be a considerable number of in dividuals so poiso ned who have not come under observation." The policy implications for him were that leaded gasoline "should be withheld from public consumption unt il it is conclusively shown th at it is not poisonou s. "69 Dr. Alice Hamilton, one of the country 's foremost authorities on lead , agreed with those opposed to tetraethyl lead . At the confe re nce she expressed he r belief that the en viro nmental health issues were far more important than the occupational health and safety issues, adding that she doubted that any effective measures could be imple me nted to protect the general public fro m the hazards of wid epsread use of leaded gasoli ne. " You may control cond itions within a fac tory," she said, " but how are you goi ng to control th e whole cou nt ry?" In an extended commenta ry after the co nference on th e issues that it raised, Hamilton stated, " I am not one of those who believe that the use of this leaded gasoline ca n ever be made safe . No lead industry has ever, even un der the strictest control, lost all its dangers. Where there is lead some case of lead poisoning soo ner or later develops , eve n under the strictest supervision. " 10-12 Furlher Tesls. Siudies Urged Most public healt h professionals did not agree with Henderson and Hamilton, however. Many too k th e position that it wa s unfair to ban t hi s new gaso l.ine add iti ve until defin itive proof exis ted th at it was a real danger. In the face of indu stry argument s that oil supplies were limited and that there was an extraordinary need to co nserve fuel by making combustion more efficient , most public health workers believed that there should be overwhelming evidence that leaded gasoline actuall y harmed people before it was bann ed. Dr. Henry F. Vaughan, president of the American Pu blic Heal th Association, said that such evidence did not exist. "Cen ainl y in a stud y of the statistics in our large cities there is nothing which would warrant a health commissioner in sayi ng that you could not sell eth yl gasoline, " he pointed out. Vaughan ack nowledged that there should be further tests a nd studies of the problem bu t th at " so far as Ihe present situat ion is concerned, as a health admin istrator I feel that it is enti rely negative." Emery Hay hurst also argued this point at the Surgeon General's Confe re nce, mai ntain ing that th e widespread use of leaded gasoli ne for 27 month s " should have sufficed to bring out some mi shaps and poisonings , suspected to have been caused by tetraeth yl lead . "1 3-1S While Hay hurst and oth er ex pe rt s pu blicly supported th e use of leaded gasoline, many of them voiced serious doubts in pri vate . One investigator fro m Columbia Uni versity. Frederick Fli nn, articulated his fears in a personal co mmu nication to R. R. Sayers of the United States Public Health Service a nd the Bureau of Mines, saying " The more I work with the materi al [tetraethyl lead] th e more I am confused as to whether it is a real public health hazard ." He felt that much depended upon the special conditions of exposure in industry and on the street but in the end stated he was "convinced that there is some hazard-the extent of which must be studied around garages and fiUing stations over a period of time and by unprej udi ced persons." Given the fact tha t Flinn did his study for the Ethyl Corporation, it
is not surprising that he ended his letter by saying, "of course, you mu st understand that my remarks are confidential. " Emery Hayhurst was even more candid in hi s private correspondence to Sayers. He told Sayers of a leller he received from Dr. Thompson of the Public Health Service saying th at " lead has no business in the human body .... That everyone agrees lead is an undesirable hazard and the only way to control it is to stop its use by the general public." Hayhurst acknowledged to Sayers, however) that political and economic considerations influenced hi s scientific judgment. " PersonaJl y I can quite agree with Dr. Thompson's wholesome point of view, but still I am afraid human progress cannot go on under such restrictions and thaI where things can be handled safely by proper supervision and regulation they mu st be allowed to proceed if we are to survive among the nations. Dr. Thompson's arguments might also be applied to gasoline and to the thousand and one other poisons and hazards which characterize our modern civilization. "76.77 Company Suspends Manufacture. Sales Blue Ribbon Commiltee 10 Investigate Despite the widespread ambivalence on the pan of public health professionals and the opposition to any curbs on production on the part of industry spokespeople, the public suspicions aroused by the preceding year's events led to a significant victory for those who opposed the sale of leaded gasoline. AI Ihe end of the conference, the Ethy l Corporation announced that it was suspending the production and distribution of leaded gasoline until the scientific and public heahh issues involved in its manufacture could be resolved. The conference also called upon the Surgeon Ge neral to organize a blue ribbon committee of the nation 's foremost public health scientists to co nduct an investigation of leaded gasoline. Among those asked to part icipate were David Edsall of Harvard University, Julius Steiglitz of the Hamilton and other opponents of leaded gasoline, the conference appeared to be a major victory for it wrested from industry the power to decide on the future of an important industrial poison, and placed it in the hand s of uni versity scientists. "To anyone who had followed the cou rse of industrial medi cine for as much as ten years," Alice Hamilton remarked one month afte r the co nference, "this conference marks a great progress from the days when we used to meet the underlings of the great muniti on makers [during World War J] and coax and plead with them to put in the precautionary measures .... This time it was possible to bring together in the office of the Su rgeon General the foremost me n in indu strial med ic ine and public health and the men who are in real authorit y in industry and to have a blaze of publicity turned on their deliberations. " 7' The initial euphoria ove r tbe appare nt victory of"objective" science over political and economic self-i nterest was short lived. The blue ribbon committee, mandated to deliver an early decision, de signed a short-term and, in retrospect, chauffeurs of cars using gasoline wi thout lead while 77 were chauffeurs using leaded gasoline over a period of two years. Also, 21 olhers were controls employed as garage workers or filling station attendants where unleaded gasoline was used and 57 were engaged in si milar work where tetraethyl gas was used. As another means of co mparison , 61 men were tested in two industrial plants known to have se rious exposure to lead du st. As a result of their study , th e committee concluded seven months after the conference that "in its opi nion there are at present no good grounds for prohibiting the use of ethyl gasoli ne ... provided that its distribution and use are controlled by proper regulations. " They suggested that the Surgeon General formulate specific regulations with enforcement by the stales .' '-'''' Ahhough it appears thaI the committee rushed to judgment in only seven months , it must be pointed out that this group saw their study as only a n interim repOrl , to be followed by longer range follow-up studies in ensuing years. In their final report to the Surgeon General , the committee warned:
"it remains possible thai if the use of leaded gasoline becomes widespread cond itions may arise very different from those studied by us which would render its use more of a hazard than would appear to be the case from this investigation . Longer experie nce may show that even such slight storage of lead as was obse rved in these studie s may lead eventuall y in suscept ible ind ividuals to recogni zable or to chronic degenerative diseases of a less obv ious character."
Recognizing that their short-term investigation was incapable of detecting such danger, the committee concluded th at further study by the governme nt was essential:
" In view of such possibilit ies the committee feels that the investigalion begun under their direction must not be aJ lowed 10 lapse ... . It should be possible to follow closely the outcome of a more extended use of this fuel and to determine whether or not it may const itute a menace 10 Ihe health of the general public after prolonged use or ot her conditions not now foreseen . ... The vast increase in the number of automobiles throughout the country makes the study of all such questions a matter of real importance from the standpoint of public health and the committee urges strongly that a suitable appropriation be requested from Congress for the continuance of these investigations under the supervi sion of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service. "&1-8<1 These suggestions were never carried out and subse· quent studies of the use of tetraethyllead were conducted by the Ethyl Corporation and scientists employed by them. 8 ' .86 In direct contradiction to the recommendations of the com· mittee, Robert Kehoe who carried out the studies for Ethyl, wrote : "as it appeared from their investigation that there was no evidence of immediate danger to the public health, it was thought that these necessarily exte nsive studies should not be repeated at present , at publi c expense. but that they should be continued at the expense of the industry most concerned , subject, however, to the supervision of the Public Health Service." It should not be surpri si ng that Kehoe concluded that his study "fails to show any evidence for the existence of such hazards. "117
Whllf Weill Wrong ?
Today , looking back at the controversy ofthe 1 920s , we may be tempted to look askance at public health professionals of the period who put their faith in the ability of scientific investigations to settle this thorny political and eco nomic issue , After all , those like Alice Hamilton and Yandell Henderson who fought the introduction of lead into gasoline were the strongest advocates of governmentally spo nsored scientific study to determine the safety or dangers of tetra· ethyl lead, What went wrong? Why is tetraethyl lead still a prime source of lead in the environment? Of course. there were those who had such an ideological commitment to industrial progress that they were willing to put their science aside to meet the dema nds of corporate greed. But , more importantly , we should look at those who considered themselves to be objective scie ntific investigators. Ultimately, it was impossible to separate their "science" from the de· mands of an economy and society that was being built around the automob il e. How else, then, do we explain public health scientists' willingness to conduct a short·term study that could not resolve the long·term healt h issues. By agreeing to provide qu ick answe rs they guaranteed that this vital industry would not be disrupted, The symptoms of lead accumulatio n due to exhaust em issions would be unlike anything they had previously encou ntered in industrial popu· lations. In the long run , th ose most affected would not be adults. but children, slowly accumulating lead . Their suffe r· ing speaks more to the interlocking relationships between science and society than to the absence of a link between lead and disease.
